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Abstract
In this paper, we address the knowledge engineering prob-
lems for hypothesis generation motivated by applications that
require timely exploration of hypotheses under unreliable ob-
servations. We looked at two applications: malware detection
and intensive care delivery. In intensive care, the goal is to
generate plausible hypotheses about the condition of the pa-
tient from clinical observations and further refine these hy-
potheses to create a recovery plan for the patient. Similarly,
preventing malware spread within a corporate network in-
volves generating hypotheses from network traffic data and
selecting preventive actions. To this end, building on the al-
ready established characterization and use of AI planning for
similar problems, we propose use of planning for the hypoth-
esis generation problem. However, to deal with uncertainty,
incomplete model description and unreliable observations,
we need to use a planner capable of generating multiple high-
quality plans. To capture the model description we propose a
language called LTS++ and a web-based tool that enables the
specification of the LTS++ model and a set of observations.
We also proposed a 9-step process that helps provide guid-
ance to the domain expert in specifying the LTS++ model.
The hypotheses are then generated by running a planner on
the translated LTS++ model and the provided trace. The hy-
potheses can be visualized and shown to the analyst or can be
further investigated automatically.
Introduction
Several application scenarios require the construction of hy-
potheses presenting alternative explanation of a sequence of
possibly unreliable observations. For example, the evolution
of the state of the patient over time in an Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) of a hospital can be inferred from a variety of mea-
surements. Similarly, observations from network traffic can
indicate possible malware. The hypotheses, represented as
a sequence of changes in patient state, aim to present an
explanation for these observations, while providing deeper
insight into the actual underlying causes for these observa-
tions, helping to make decisions about further testing, treat-
ment or other actions.
Expert judgment is the primary method used for generat-
ing hypotheses and evaluating their plausibility. Automated
methods have been proposed, to assist the expert, and help
improve accuracy and scalability. Notably, model-based di-
agnosis methods can determine whether observations can be
explained by a model (e.g., (Cassandras and Lafortune 1999;
Sampath et al. 1995)). Recently, several researchers have
proposed use of automated planning technology to address
several related class of problems including diagnosis (e.g.,
(Sohrabi, Baier, and McIlraith 2010; Haslum and Grastien
2011)), plan recognition (Ramı´rez and Geffner 2009), and
finding excuses (Go¨belbecker et al. 2010). These problems
share a common goal of finding a sequence of actions that
can explain the set of observations given the model-based
description of the system. However, most of the existing lit-
erature make an assumption that the observations are all per-
fectly reliable and should be explainable by the system de-
scription, otherwise no solution exists for the given problem.
But that is not true in general. For example, even though ob-
servations resulting from the analysis of network data can
be unreliable, we would still like to explain as many obser-
vations as possible with respect to our model; as a further
complication, we cannot assume the model is complete.
In 2011, Sohrabi et al. established a relationship between
generating explanations, a more general form of diagno-
sis, and a planning problem (Sohrabi, Baier, and McIlraith
2011). Recently, we extend this work to address unreliable
observations and showed how to generate multiple high-
quality plans or the plausible hypotheses (Sohrabi, Udrea,
and Riabov 2013). In this paper, we address knowledge en-
gineering problems of capturing the domain knowledge.
To capture the model description we propose a language
called LTS++, derived from LTS (Labeled Transition Sys-
tem) (Magee and Kramer 2006) for defining models for
hypothesis generation, and associating observation types.
LTS++ is less expressive than the general Planning Domain
Definition Language (PDDL) specification of a planning
problem (McDermott 1998). However, in our experience,
the domain expert finds writing an LTS++ language much
simpler than PDDL. To further help the domain expert, we
also proposed a process that helps provide guidance in spec-
ifying the LTS++ model. Additionally, we developed a web-
based tool that enables the specification of the LTS++ model
and a set of observations. Our tool features syntax highlight-
ing, error detection, and visualization of the state transition
graph. The hypotheses are then generated by running a plan-
ner on the translated LTS++ model and the provided obser-
vation trace. The hypotheses can be visualized and shown to
the analyst or can be further investigated automatically.
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Figure 1 (a): Malware detection Figure 1 (b): Intensive care
In the rest of the paper, we will first describe our two
application examples in detail. We then describe the archi-
tecture of our automated hypothesis exploration problem
in which hypothesis generation plays a key role. Then we
describe the relationship between planning and hypothesis
generation, which facilitates the use of planning technology.
We show our initial experimental results in using planning.
We then describe our LTS++ language, the creation process,
LTS++ IDE, and show several example problems.
Application Description
In this section we introduce two example applications that
illustrate our approach: intensive care delivery and malware
detection. A key characteristic of these applications is that
the true state of monitored patients, network hosts, or other
entities, while essential for timely detection and prevention
of critical conditions, is not directly observable. Instead, we
must analyze the sequence of available observations to re-
construct the state. To make this possible, our approach re-
lies on a model of the entity consisting of states, transitions
between states, and many-to-many correspondence between
states and observations. In the following sections we will
describe how these models can be created by the domain ex-
perts and encoded in our LTS++ language.
Figure 1 shows state transition systems of intensive case
and malware detection. The rounded rectangles are states.
The states are associated with a type, good or bad, and drawn
in blue or red respectively. The callouts are observations as-
sociated with these states. Note that the observations are ob-
tained by analyzing raw data gathered through sensors.
In Figure 1 (a), the bad state correspond to malware life-
cycle, such as the host becoming infected with malware, the
bot’s rendezvous with a Command and Control (C&C) ma-
chine (botmaster), and a number of exploits – uses of the
bot for malicious activity. Each of the states can be achieved
in many ways, depending on the type and capabilities of
the malware. For example, the CC Rendezvous state can be
achieved by attempting to contact an Internet domain, or
via Internet Relay Chat (IRC) on a dedicated channel. The
good state in Figure 1 (a) corresponds to a “normal” life-
cycle of a web crawler compressed into a single state. Note
that crawler behavior can also generate a subset of the ob-
servations that malware may generate. The callouts are the
observations associated with states. For example, the ob-
servation HighNXVolume is an observation associated with
the ByDomainName state that corresponds to an abnormally
high number of domain does not exist responses for Domain
Name System (DNS) queries; such an observation may indi-
cate that the bot and its botmaster are using a domain name
generation algorithm, and the bot is testing generated do-
main names trying to find its master.
In Figure 1 (b), the bad states correspond to critical states
of a patient such as Infection, DCI, or Highrisk. The good
states are the non-critical states. Upon admission the pa-
tient is either in Lowrisk or in Highrisk. From a Highrisk
state, they may get to the Infection, Infarction, or the DCI
state. From Lowrisk they may get to the Highrisk state or
be Discharged from ICU. The patient enters Icudeath from
Infection, Infarction, or DCI state. The patient’s condition
may improve; hence the patient’s state may move back to
the Lowrisk state from for example the Infection state. The
observations are measured based on the raw data captured
by patient monitoring devices (e.g., the patient’s blood pres-
sure, heat rate, temperature) as well as other measurements
and computations provided by doctors and nurses. For ex-
ample, given the patient’s heart rate, their blood pressure,
and their temperature, which are measured continuously,
their SIRS score can be computed, producing an integer be-
tween 0 to 4. Similarly, a result of CT Scan, or a lab test will
indicate other possible observations about the patient.
While the complexity of the analysis involved to obtain
one observation can vary, it is important to note that obser-
vations are by nature unreliable:
The set of observations will be incomplete. Operational
constraints will prevent us running in-depth analysis on all
of the data all the time. However, all observations are typi-
cally time stamped, and hence totally ordered.
Observations may be ambiguous. This is depicted in Fig-
ure 1, where for instance contacting a blacklisted domain
may be evidence of malware activity, or maybe a crawler
that reaches such a domain during normal navigation. Simi-
larly, Heart Rate Variability Low (HRVL) may be explained
by many states such as DCI or Highrisk or Infection.
Not all observations will be explainable. There are several
reasons while some observations may remain unexplained:
(i) observations are (sometimes weak) indicators of a behav-
ior, rather than authoritative measurements; (ii) the model
description is by necessity incomplete, unless we are able to
design a perfect model; (iii) in the case of malware detec-
tion, malware could try to confuse detectors by either hiding
in normal traffic patterns or originating extra traffic.
For Figure 1 (a) one can consider the following two ob-
servations for a host: (o1) a download from a blacklisted do-
main and (o2) an increase in traffic with ad servers. Note
that according to Figure 1 (a), this sequence could be ex-
plained by two hypotheses: (a) a crawler or (b) infection by
downloading from a blacklisted domain, a C&C rendezvous
which we were unable to observe, and an exploit involv-
ing click fraud. In such a setting, it is normal to believe (a)
is more plausible than (b) since we have no evidence of a
C&C rendezvous taking place. However, take the sequence
(o1) followed by (o3) an increase in IRC traffic followed by
(o2). In this case, it is reasonable to believe that the pres-
ence of malware – as indicated by the C&C rendezvous on
IRC – is more likely than crawling, since crawlers do not
use IRC. The crawling hypothesis cannot be completely dis-
carded since it may well be that a crawler program is running
in background, while a human user is using IRC to chat.
Consider the following observation sequence for the
model in Figure 1 (b): HH3, HRVL. This denotes a patient
with a Hunt and Hess (a grading system used to classify the
severity of subarachnoid hemorrhage) score of 3, followed
by HRVL. Since HRVL is an ambiguous observation – i.e.,
can be indicative of multiple states –, equally plausible hy-
potheses may be:
Unadmitted→ Highrisk or
Unadmitted→ Highrisk→ PatientNoLead or
Unadmitted→ Highrisk→ Infarction or
Unadmitted→ Highrisk→ DCI.
Note, although the current state of the patient is unknown,
the generated hypotheses indicate that it is one of Highrisk,
PatientNoLead, Infarction or DCI.
Given a sequence of observations and the model, the hy-
pothesis generation task infers a number of plausible hy-
potheses about the evolution of the entity. Practically, we
have to analyze multiple hypotheses about an entity because
the state transition model may be incomplete or the obser-
vations may be unreliable. The result of our automated tech-
nique can then be presented to a network administrator (or to
a doctor) or to an automated system for further investigation
and testing. Next, we will describe briefly all the necessary
components for hypothesis exploration.
Architecture
Our work on automated exploration of hypotheses focuses
on the Hypothesis Generation, which is part of a larger auto-
mated data analysis system that includes sensors, actuators,
multiple analytic platforms and a Tactical Planner. Tactical
Planner, for the purpose of this paper, should be viewed as a
component responsible for execution of certain strategic ac-
tions and it can be implemented using, for example, a clas-
sical planner to compose analytics (Bouillet et al. 2009). A
high-level overview of the complete system architecture is
shown in Figure 2. All components of the architecture, with
the exception of application-specific analytics, sensors, and
actuators, are designed to be reused without modification in
a variety of application domains.
The system receives input from Sensors, and Analytics
translate sensor data to observations. The Hypothesis Gen-
erator interprets the observations received from analytics,
and generates hypotheses about the state of Entities in the
Analytic Platform(s) 
Sensors Actuators 
Offline 
Analytics 
Strategic Planner 
Hypothesis Generator Tactical Planner 
Online  
Analytics 
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World 
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Figure 2: System architecture
World. Depending on application domain, the entities may
correspond to patients in a hospital, or to computers con-
nected to a corporate network, or other kinds of objects of
interest. The Strategic Planner evaluates these hypotheses
and initiates preventive or testing actions in response. Some
of the testing actions can be implemented as additional pro-
cessing of data, setting new goals for the Tactical Planner,
which composes and deploys analytics across multiple Ana-
lytic Platforms. A Hadoop cluster, for example, can be used
as an analytic platform for offline analysis of historical data
accumulated in one or more Data Stores. Alternatively, a
Stream Computing cluster can be used for fast online analy-
sis of new data received from the sensors.
Preventive actions, as well as some of the testing actions,
are dispatched to Actuators. There is no expectation that ev-
ery actuation request will succeed, or always happen instan-
taneously. Actuation in a hospital setting can involve dis-
patching alerts to doctors, or lab test recommendations.
Hypothesis Generation via Planning
In this section, we define the hypothesis generation problem
and describe its relationship to planning. We also provide
experimental evaluation that supports the premise of using
planning for generating multiple plausible hypotheses. In the
next section, we will describe how the planning model can
be captured using the LTS++ language which we translate to
a planning problem. Our tool, LTS++ hypothesis generator,
then uses a planning to compute plausible hypothesis and
present them to the user.
Following our recent work (Sohrabi, Udrea, and Riabov
2013), a dynamical system is defined as Σ = (F,A, I),
where F is a finite set of fluent symbols, A is a set of ac-
tions with preconditions and effects that describes actions
that account for the possible transitions of the state of the
entity (e.g., patient or host) as well as the discard action that
addresses unreliable observations by allowing observations
to be unexplained, and I is a clause over F that defines the
initial state. The instances of the discard action add tran-
sitions to the system that account for leaving an observa-
tion unexplained. The added transitions ensure that we took
all observations into account, but an instance of the discard
action for a particular observation o indicates that o is not
explained. Actions can be over both “good” and “bad” be-
haviors. This maps to “good” and “bad” states of the entity,
different from a system state (i.e., set of fluents over F ).
Hand-crafted 10 states 50 states 100 states
Observations % Solved Time % Solved Time % Solved Time % Solved Time
5 100% 2.49 70% 0.98 80% 5.61 30% 14.21
10 100% 2.83 90% 2.04 50% 25.09 30% 52.63
20 90% 12.31 70% 24.46 - - - -
40 70% 3.92 40% 81.11 - - - -
60 60% 6.19 - - - - - -
80 50% 8.19 - - - - - -
100 60% 11.73 10% 10.87 - - - -
120 70% 20.35 20% 15.66 - - - -
Table 1: The percentage of problems where the ground truth was generated, and the average time spent for LAMA.
An observation formula ϕ is a sequence of fluents in F we
refer to as trace. Given a trace ϕ, and the system description
Σ, a hypothesis α is a sequence of actions in A such that α
satisfies ϕ in the system Σ. We also define a notion of plau-
sibility of a hypothesis. Given a set of observations, there are
many possible hypotheses, but some could be stated as more
plausible than others. For example, since observations are
not reliable, the hypothesis α can explain a subset of obser-
vations by including instances of the discard action. How-
ever, we can indicate that a hypothesis that includes the min-
imum number of discard actions is more plausible. In addi-
tion, observations can be ambiguous: they can be explained
by instances of “good” actions as well as “bad” actions. Sim-
ilar to the diagnosis problem, a more plausible hypothesis
ideally has the minimum number of “bad” or “faulty” ac-
tions. More formally, given a system Σ and two hypotheses
α and α′ we assume that we can have a reflexive and transi-
tive plausibility relation , where α  α′ indicates that α is
at least as plausible as α′.
The hypothesis generation problem is then defined as
P = (F,A′, I, ϕ) where A′ is the set A with the addition of
positive action costs that accounts for the plausibility rela-
tion . A hypothesis is a plan for P, and the most plausible
hypothesis is the minimum cost plan. That is, if α and α′
are two hypotheses, where α is more plausible than α′, then
cost(α) < cost(α′). Therefore, the most plausible hypothe-
sis is the minimum cost plan.
While some class of plausibility relation can be ex-
pressed as Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL3)
(Gerevini et al. 2009) preferences, cost-based planners are
(currently) more advanced than PDDL3-based planners, and
so the technique proposed by Keyder and Geffner 2009 can
be used to compile preferences into costs, enabling the use
of cost-based planners instead.
Computing Plausible Hypotheses
To address uncertainty, the unreliability of observations and
incomplete model description, we must generate multiple
high-quality (or low-cost) plans that correspond to a set of
plausible hypothesis. To this end, we adapt our implemen-
tation of hypothesis generation from (Sohrabi, Udrea, and
Riabov 2013). We encode the plausibility notion as actions
costs. In particular, we assign a high cost to the discard ac-
tion in order to encourage explaining more observations. In
addition, we assign a higher cost to all instances of the ac-
tions that represent “bad” behaviors than those that repre-
sent “good” behaviors. Furthermore, shorter/simpler plans
are assumed to be more plausible. To address observations,
we similarly compile them away in our encoding following
a technique proposed in (Haslum and Grastien 2011).
The planning problem is described in PDDL. We used one
fixed PDDL encoding of the domain, but varied the prob-
lem for each problem description, which we generate auto-
matically in our experiments. We also developed a replan-
ning process around LAMA (Richter and Westphal 2010) to
generate multiple high-quality (or low-cost) plans that cor-
respond to a set of plausible hypothesis. The replanning pro-
cess works in such a way that after each round, the planning
problem is updated to disallow finding the same set of plans
in future runs of LAMA. This process continues until a time
limit is reached and then all found plans are sorted by cost
and shown to the user by our tool.
Experimental Evaluation
The experiments we describe in this section help evaluate
the response time and the accuracy of our approach. In par-
ticular, these experiments show promise of our approach in
terms of using planning. This experiments were reported in
(Sohrabi, Udrea, and Riabov 2013). We evaluated perfor-
mance by using both a hand-crafted description of the mal-
ware detection problem and a set of automatically generated
state transition systems with 60% bad and 40% good states.
To evaluate performance, we introduce the notion of
ground truth. In all experiments, the problem instances are
generated by constructing a ground truth trace by traversing
the lifecycle graph (similar to Figure 1 (a)) in a random walk,
adding with small probability, missing and inconsistent ob-
servations. We then measure performance by comparing the
generated hypotheses with the ground truth, and consider a
problem solved for our purposes if the ground truth appears
among the generated hypotheses.
For each size of the problem, we have generated 10 prob-
lem instances, and the measurements we present are aver-
ages. The measurements were done on a dual-core 3 GHz
Intel Xeon processor and 8 GB memory, running 64-bit Red-
Hat Linux. We used a 300 seconds time limit.
Table 1 summarizes the result. The rows and the columns
indicate the problem size, measured by the number of obser-
vations and the number of states. The hand-crafted column,
is the example shown in Figure 1 (a), which has 18 states.
The generated problems consisted of 10, 50 and 100 states.
The % Solved column shows the percentage of problems
where the ground truth was among the generated plans. The
Time column shows the average time it took from the be-
ginning of iterations to find the ground truth solution for the
solved problems. The dash entries indicate that the ground
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Figure 3: Process for LTS++ model creation
truth was not found within the time limit.
The results show that planning can be used successfully to
generate hypotheses for malware detection, even in the pres-
ence of unreliable observations, especially for smaller size
problems. The correct hypothesis was generated in most ex-
periments with up to 10 observations. However, in some of
the larger instances LAMA could not find any plans. More-
over, in the smaller size problems, more replanning rounds is
done within the time limit and hence more distinct plans are
generated which increases the chance of finding the ground
truth. The results for the hand-crafted malware example also
suggest that the problems arising in practice may be easier
than randomly generated ones, which had more state transi-
tions and higher branching factor.
We believe that LAMA would have had a better chance
of detecting the ground truth trace if instead of finding a
set of high-quality plans it could have generated the top k
plans, where k could be determined based on a particular
scenario. In future work, we plan to evaluate our approach
using a planner capable of finding top k plans. Nevertheless,
the experiments support our findings, namely, that the use of
planning is promising.
LTS++ Model
To help new users, we have built a web-based tool for gen-
erating hypotheses and developing state transition models,
which we use in our experiments and applications. In par-
ticular, we have designed a language called LTS++, derived
from LTS (Labeled Transition System) (Magee and Kramer
2006), for defining models for hypothesis generation, and
associating observation types with states. In this section, we
describe a process that the user or the domain expert might
undergo in order to define an LTS++ model. We will also
describe the LTS++ IDE and the LTS++ syntax.
Steps in Creating an LTS++ Model
Figure 3 shows a 9-step creation process for an LTS++
model. The arrows are intended to indicate the most typical
transitions between steps: transitions that are not shown are
not prohibited. This process is meant to help provide guid-
ance to the new users in developing an LTS++ model. In this
section, we will go over the first 7 steps.
In step 1, the user needs to identify the entity. This may
depend on the objective of the hypothesis generator, the
available data, and the available actions. For example, in the
malware detection problem, the entity is the host, while in
the intensive care delivery problem the entity is the patient.
In step 2, the domain expert identifies the states of the entity.
As we saw in the application section, the states of patient for
© 2014 IBM Corporation – All Rights Reserved 8 
Figure 4: LTS++ IDE
example could be for example DCI, Infection, and Highrisk.
Since the state transition model is manually specified and
contains a fixed set of observation types, while potentially
trying to model an open world with an unlimited number of
possible states and observations, the model can be incom-
plete at any time, and may not support precise explanations
for all observation sequences. To address this on the mod-
eling side, and provide feedback to model designers about
states that may need to be added, we have introduced a hier-
archical decomposition of states. In some configurations, the
algorithm allows designating a subset of the state transition
system as a hyperstate. In this case, if a transition through
one or several states of the hyperstate is required, but no spe-
cific observation is associated with the transition, the hyper-
state itself is included as part of the hypothesis, indicating
that the model may have a missing state within the hyper-
state, and that state in turn may need a new observation type
associated with it. In the malware detection problem, the In-
fection, Exploit, CC rendezvous are the hyperstates.
The user needs to identify a set of observations for the
particular problem; this is done in step 3. The available data,
the entity, and the identified states may help define and re-
strict the space of observations. In step 4, the domain expert
has to find out all possible transitions between states. This
may be a tedious task, depending on the number of states.
However, one can use hyperstates to help manage these tran-
sitions. Any transition of the hyper states is carried out to its
substates. In step 5, the user has to associate observations to
states. This associations is shown in Figure 1 using the green
callouts. In step 6, one can optionally designate a state as the
starting state. The domain expert can also create a separate
starting state that indicates a one of notation by transition-
ing to multiple states. For example, in the malware detection
problem, the starting state “start” indicates a “one of” nota-
tion as it transitions to both Infection and Crawling.
In step 7, the user can specify state types which indicate
that some states are more plausible than the others. State
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Figure 5: LTS++ model for malware detection
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Figure 6: LTS++ model for the intensive care
types are related to the “good” vs. “bad” behaviors and they
influence the ranking between hypotheses. For example, the
hypothesis that the host is crawling is more plausible than it
being infected, given the same trace, which can be explained
by both hypotheses.
LTS++ IDE
LTS++ IDE is a web-based tool that helps users create plan-
ning problems by describing LTS++ models and generate
hypotheses. LTS++ IDE consists of an LTS++ editor, graph-
ical view of the transition system, specification of the trace,
and generation of hypotheses. The tool automatically gen-
erates planning problems from the LTS++ specification and
entered trace. The generated hypotheses are the result of run-
ning a planner and presenting the result from top-most plau-
sible hypothesis to the least plausible hypothesis.
Figure 4 shows the LTS++ IDE. The top part is the LTS++
language editor which allows syntax highlighting and the
bottom part is the automatically generated transition graph.
The transition graph can be very useful for debugging pur-
poses. LTS++ IDE also features error detection with re-
spect to the LTS++ syntax. The errors and warning signs
are shown below the text editor. They too can be used for
debugging the model creation as part of step 8.
Figure 5 and 6 shows the LTS++ model for the malware
detection and intensive care applications from Figure 1 re-
spectively. The states are shown in blue with hyperstates
specified in all caps. The observations are specified within
the curly brackets and are shown in green. You can specify
multiple observations by using space or comma between ob-
servations (see line 6). The state types are specified within
angle brackets (see line 2). The transitions between states
are specified using arrows. Each transition needs to be spec-
ified within a hyperstate. Multiple transitions between states
within a hyperstate can be specified using the vertical bar.
The default state type is specified in line 1 and the starting
state is specified in the last line.
Generating Hypotheses via LTS++ IDE
In this section, we will first explain how observations can be
entered into the LTS++ IDE and then we will go through a
number of examples for both of our applications, and explain
how to interpret the generated results. This is the final step
of the LTS++ model creation (i.e., step 9, testing).
Observations can be entered by clicking on the “Next: edit
trace” from the LTS++ IDE main page shown in Figure 4.
Figure 7 (a) shows an example where the first observation
is selected to be a download of an executable, and the sec-
ond observation is now being selected from the drop-down
menu. Once the trace selection is complete, the hypotheses
can be generated by clicking on “Generate hypotheses”. The
hypotheses are presented to the user 10 per page, and users
can navigate through these pages. The next 10 hypotheses
are generated once the user clicks on the “Next page”. Note,
the trace editor is intended mainly for testing purposes, and
in operation the system will read observations automatically
from an input queue.
Figure 7 (b-f) show sample example runs for the malware
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Figure 7 (e): Intensive care example 2 Figure 7 (f): Intensive care example 3
and intensive care examples; these results are automatically
generated by our tool. Each hypothesis is shown as a se-
quence of states matched to observed event sequence (via
green dashed lines). The observations that are explained by a
state are shown in green ovals, and unexplained observations
are shown in purple. The arrows between the observations
show the sequence of observations in the trace. The states
shown in red are the bad states and good states are drawn in
blue. Each hypothesis is associated with a cost. The lower
the cost, the more plausible is the hypothesis.
Figure 7 (b) shows the top 3 generated hypotheses for the
trace selected in Figure 7 (a). Our first hypothesis explained
both observations. The second hypothesis, almost as plausi-
ble, shows infection followed by the CC state. The third hy-
pothesis leaves the second observation unexplained. In some
instances, hypotheses include states that are not linked to
any observation. For example, the CC, CC Domain, cc p2p
are the unobserved states in the non-crawling hypotheses in
Figure 7 (c). Figure 7 (d) shows the automated generated re-
sults (the top-4) for an ambiguous observation HRVL. The
result of more specific, less ambiguous observation traces
are shown in Figure 7 (e,f).
Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we address the knowledge engineering prob-
lem of hypothesis generation motivated by two applications:
malware detection and intensive care delivery. To this end,
we proposed a modeling language called LTS++ and a web-
based tool that enables the specification of a model using
the LTS++ language. We also proposed a 9-step process that
helps provide guidance to the domain expert in specifying
the LTS++ model. Our tool, LTS++ IDE, features syntax
highlighting, error detection, and visualization of the state
transition graph. The hypotheses are generated by running
a planner capable of generating multiple high-quality plans
for the translated LTS++ model and the provided trace. The
hypotheses can be visualized and shown to the analyst (doc-
tor or network administrator), or can be further investigated
automatically via the Strategic Planner (see the Architecture
Section) to run testing or preventive actions.
In terms of evaluation of our model, we have worked with
users outside of our group to develop different LTS++ mod-
els in different domains. The feedback we received from
them is positive and helped us improve our tool and the
creation process. Particularly, one of models developed this
way is now used within a larger application.
Our approach in using planning is related to several ap-
proaches in the diagnosis literature in which the use of plan-
ners as well as SAT solvers is explored (e.g., (Grastien et
al. 2007; Sohrabi, Baier, and McIlraith 2010)). In particu-
lar, the work on applying planning for the intelligent alarm
processing application is most relevant (Bauer et al. 2011;
Haslum and Grastien 2011). The authors have considered
the case where they can encounter unexplainable observa-
tions, but have not provided a formal description of what
these unexplainable observations represent or how the plan-
ning framework can model them. In this work we address
this, as well provide tools for domain experts and introduce
a simple language that can be used instead of PDDL.
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